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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STEVEN M. ESERNIA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

CASE N·O.
719'5

OVERLAND MOVING CO·MP ANY, a
corporation, and THOMAS C. JONES,
Defendants and Respondents.
I

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACiTS
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts set forth
in Appellant's brief, except in the following particulars:
1. It is stated by Appellant that the evidence is not
entirely clear as to whether the driver of the van stated to
Esernia that he was sleepy and wanted someone to keep him
company so he wouldn't fall asleep before Esernia entered
the van or after the journey had started. The record shows
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that Esernia stated that the driver of the van told him before he got in the truck that he (the driver) "was tired"
and '''wanted somebody to keep him company on the road,
so he wouldn't fall asleep." .(R. 122·-123.)
And you and your buddy, called Meredith,
were standing in front of the hamburger stand and
you were talking to some girls?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.

"Q. And the truck driver drove up and stopped
and asked you if you were going to Salt Lake?
"A. He asked us if we wanted a ride to Salt
Lake.

Is that all he said to you at that time?
"A. Well, we argued a little bit. I did not want
to go. One of us dia not want to go, I believe it was
Meredith wanted to go. I wanted to stay there with
the girls. He wanted to go. The driver said, then,
he wanted some company.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Did he say why he wanted some company?
He was kind of weary.
He said he was kind of weary?
Yes sir.

Did he say anything else about being weary
at that time?
"A. I don't believe so.
"Q.

"Q.

Did he say why he wanted you to go with

him?
"A. He wanted us to talk to him, he wanted
company.
Why did he want you to talk to him?
"A. He wanted company, something to do, besides driving, I suppose.
"Q.
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"Q.

Did he tell you why he wanted company?

MR. THURMAN : You are now talking
about in Elko?
MR. JONE8 : In Elko.
"A. Well, I don't know if it was right there on
the spot, or after we got in the truck, but a little
while after we did get in the truck, and he told us he
was tired and he wanted somebody to talk to.
Your deposition was taken, was it not, in
Connecticut?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.

I am goin to read to you your answer to
the same question.
"Q.

How did he happen to pick you up?
"· 'A. We were standing there talking to
the girls. We were going to stay with the girls
that night. This driver pulled up alongside of
us. He stopped his truck and he asked us if
we wanted a ride, and we told him we were
going to stay in that town. We sort of figured
if we went all the way to Salt Lake we would
not be able to get back in time. He told us he
was tired, he wanted somebody to keep him
company on the road, so he wouldn't fall asleep
and he asked us if we would not go with him.
" 'Well, the fellow I was with wanted to
go to Salt Lake and I wanted to stay around
with the girls. We argued a little while, and
the truck driver wanted lls to go with him, so
we went.'
. " 'Q.

Was that your answer to that question?
"A. Yes, I believe it was,-
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Was that what happened?
"A. Well, I don't know word for word, but that
is about the same thing.
"Q.

Did he, at any time, after you started on
the road from Elko to Salt Lake, again tell you that
he was tired and sleepy?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.

I

"Q.

How long was that after you got into the

truck?
"A.

I- don't know that, I don't know how long.

Well, did he tell you how far he had driven
without sleep or rest?
''A. He told us he came from San Francisco,
California.
"Q.

"Q. Did he tell you he had come from San Francisco without any sleep or rest?
"A. Yes sir.

"Q.

"A.

And he had been driving all the time?
Yes sir." (R. 121-122.-12·3-.)

Later in the trial of the case, Esernia testified as fol-·
lows:
He told you he was tired and sleepy at the
time he picked you up; is that correct?
"A. Yes sir.
"Q.

Then he told you he was tired and sleepy
about two hours afterward; is that correct?
"A. I think he told us he was tired and sleepy
after that first time he went on the shoulder, that
was,about, maybe two or three hours afterwards.
"Q.

He did tell you he was tired and sleepy before you got on the fruck?
"A. I don't know if we were in the truck or
getting in the truck. I know it was in Elko there.
"Q.
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'~Q.

Before you started on the trip, at any rate?

"A.

Yes sir." (R. 142-143.)

2. The Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's
brief fails to set forth the fact that Esernia did not at any
time after entering the van request permission to leave it.
The testimony of Esernia·· shows that after he entered the
van, the driver several times stated that he was sleepy and
tired, and that he, Esernia, or Meredith would have to keep
talking to the driver in order to keep him awake. (R. 124,
143, 82.) The testimony of Esernia also shows that sometime after the van left Elko it went off the road and bounced
along the shoulder of the highway, and that the driver of
the van stated that "he had dozed off". ( R. 86, 124.) The
record shows that neither Esernia or Meredith made any
request for permission to leave the van. (R. 13:2, 145.)
3. The Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's
brief fails to set forth the fact that Esernia had ample opportunity to leave the van, had he desired so to do. The record shows that after the van left Elko and before the accident happened, it stopped at Wendover and at Delle, Utah.
(R. 154-155.) Ese.rnia testified that he remembered a couple
of little towns between Elko and the place of the accident.
(R. 125.) The driver of the van testified (and his testimony
was in no way refuted) that the van stopped at Wendover
for about an hour. ( R. 154.) He testified that he stopped
at Delle long enough to have a piece of pie and a cup of
coffee. ( R. 155.)
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ARGUMENT

The trial court did not err in directing a verdict in favor
of the respondents.
1. It is argued by Appellant that there was sufficient
evidence in this case to require the trial court to submit to
the jury the question as to whether or not the defendants
were guilty of "willful misconduct". Whether the defendants
were or were not guilty of willful misconduct within the
meaning of those words as they are used in Section 57-11-7,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, becomes immaterial in this appeal, because the evidence in the record clearly shows that
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and that
he assumed the risk as a matter of law.
2. The evidence shoU?s that plaintiff, as a matter of
law, was guilty of contributory negligence and that he assumed the risk barring his right of recovery from the defendants.
The testimony of the plaintiff shows :
( 1) Before or at the time he entered the van, the
driver told plaintiff that he was tired and sleepy and wanted
someone to k~ep him company on the road so that he wouldn't
fall asleep. (R. 122-123.) ;
(2) After the van left Elko the driver told plaintiff
that he had driven from San Francisco, ·califQrnia, without
sleep or rest. ( R. 123.) ;
(3) After the van left Elko, the driver told the plaintiff and Meredith, the other "guest" in the van, that one of
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them could go to sleep, but one would have to stay awake
talking to him to keep him a wake. ( R. 124.) ;
( 4) About one hour, or about four hours, after they
left Elko, the driver dozed, ran off the road onto the shoulder
and stated to plaintiff and to Meredith that he had dozed
and stated that he wanted them to keep talking to him to
keep him a wake. ( R. 86, 124.) ;
(5) Plaintiff did not at any time request permission·
to leave the van. (R. 145.) ;
(6) The van passed through a couple of little towns
before the accident happened, and plaintiff did not request
permission to leave the van. (R. 125.) The driver of the
van stated that he stopped at Wendover for one hour and for
a short time at Delle, which towns are between Elko. and the
place of the accident. (R. 154-155.)
Prior to the adoption ofthe Guest statute by the State
of Utah, this court decided the case of Maybee vs. Maybee,
79 Utah 585, 11 P. (2d) 973. In that case the plaintiff
sought to recover damages against the defendant, her
mother, for personal injuries sustained by her when tne
automobile driven by her mother an~ in which she was riding as a guest hit a chuck hole and overturned. The mother
was near sighted and had always worn glasses when drivi~g.
The daughter had known for many years that the- mother
was near sighted and that she had to wear glasses. At the
time the accident occurred, the mother was not wearing her
glasses and had been driving without them for three or four
hours. At the time of the accident, f'laintiff was riding in
the front seat reading a book. Plaintiff had asked her mother
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once or twice whether she was getting along all right without her glasses and the mother replied that she was. The
mother testified that she could have seen the chuck hole had
she been wearing her glasses. This. court in that case sustained a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. In its
decision the court (page 975) stated:
"It is not disputed that every fact circumstance,
and condition relied on by the plaintiff as constituting
negligence on the part of the defendant was fully
known to and appreciated by plaintiff, and that, notwithstanding her knowledge of the fact that she was
driving without the aid of glasses, the plaintiff paid
no attention to the conditions in the road, but was
content to sit by and read a book while her mother
was driving at a speed of forty to forty-five miles an
hour. If it was negligence for the defendant to drive
at this speed with her vision impaired as it was, and
without the aid of glasses, it ~ould follow that, where
all these facts are fully known to and appreciated by
the plaintiff, and notwithstanding such facts and
such knowledge she was willing to be driven in the
car, she not only assumed the risk or hazard to her
own safety, which resulted from such driving, but,
by her acquiescence, was guilty of independent negligence which contributed. to the accident. The plaintiff identified herself with whatever negligence there
was on the ·part of the mother because of her knowledge. of all such facts and her approval, consent, and
acquiescence in the driving of the car by her mother.
* * * Because- of her acquiescence and consent
to be driven under these circumstances, she herself
participated in the negligence which caused the injury, and she is therefore barred from recovery."
This court in that case cited the case of Krueger
Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 22·2 N. W. 784, stating:
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"In Krueger v. Krueger, supra, it was held that
the plaintiff, ~he mother of defendant, could notrecover where the negligence relied on was the sleepy
condition of the driver 'who had driven a long distance and was without sleep the night before, because
the plaintiff had full knowledge of the condition of
the driver and was bound to know, as a matter of
common knowledge, what might result from the defendant dozing while at the wheel. Ordinarily a guest
may not continue to ride in the car without protest
against recklessness or negligence of the driver in
charge of the car, thereby assuming the risk and participating in the negligence, and then claim that he·
was without fault."
In the case of Markovich vs. Schlafke, et al., 284 N. W.
516, it was held that a guest who knew that the driver had
been up all night, and had been indulging in intoxicating
liquors, and who observed the drowsiness of driver, but permitted driver to remain at wheel, assumed risk of injury
sustained when driver fell asleep and automobile ran .into
ditch. In that case the court said :
"It thus clearly appears from the plaintiff's own
testimony that- he noticed that ~schlafke went to sleep
a little two or three times on the trip; that because he
observed Schlafke was sleepy he made him stop at the
intersection of county trunk E with highway No. 55
and wanted to drive the car himself; but after being
assured by the defendant that the latter knew what
he was doing he rode on with Schlafke still at the
wheel, a distance of about a half mile when Schlafke
again went to sleep and lost control of his car.
"These facts testified to by the plaintiff himself
made out about as clear a case of assumption of risk
by a guest as may well be found. In Knipfer v. Shaw,
210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, 330, 247 N·. W. 320, we
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··,

reviewed. a number of our prior cases in each of
which it had been held that the guest had assumed
the risk. We said : 'In all of those cases three elements were ·present: (1) A hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety of the guest; (2) knowledge
and appreciation of the hazard by the guest; and (3)
acquiescence or a willingness to proceed in the face
of the danger.'
"In every case where those elements have unquestionably existed we have applied our doctrine of
assumption of risk and consistently denied recovery
from the host by a gratuitous guest riding in the former's automobile. * * * Under the circumstances
of this case it clearly appears that for some time prior
to the accident a hazard or danger wholly inconsistent with the safety of the plaintiff existed; that the
plaintiff had full knowledge and appreciation of that
hazard and acquiesced or willingly continued to ride
with the defendant notwithstanding such hazard or
danger. The undisputed facts of this case more
strongly impel the conclusion that the plaintiff assumed the risk than do the facts in Krueger v.
Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784, 785, where a
guest sought to recover from her host because the
latter went to sleep while operating his automobile."

The case of Rennolds' Adm'x vs. Waggoner, 271 Ky.
300, 111 S. W. (2d) 647, involved these facts: The defendant and Rennolds with others attended a dance about 40
miles from their home. About midnight during intermission
they had lunch and some liquor but the evidence showed that
none of them were ·intoxicated. During that intermission
and when they were starting home, there was a discussion
about how hard they had worked the day before and how
tired and sleepy they were. On the return trip Rennolds
drove the car for about 20 miles. When they stopped and
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had a drink from a spring, Rennolds complained of being
sleepy and asked Waggoner to drive. Waggoner was also
tired and sleepy and when they got back into the automobile
he cautioned the others that he was sleepy and requested
that they remain awake and talk to him to keep him from
going to sleep. Shortly after leaving the spring, all of the
occupants of the car went to sleep. Within three miles of
their. home Waggoner 'vent to sleep, the automobile ran off
the road, overturned, and Rennolds was killed. The court
in that case held that the deceased Rennolds had known that
Waggoner was in a state of drowsiness and fatigu~ and when
he entered the automobile under those circumstances he assumed the risk of injury resulting from such causes.
Appellant's brief cites the case of Freedman vs. Hurwitz, 164 Atlantic 647 ('Conn. 19"33) in support of the·argument that the appellant was not guilty of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. The facts in that case differ materially from the facts established by the record in this case.
There, as appears from the opinion of the court, it was not
shown that the plaintiffs knew the defendant was tired and
sleepy at the time they entered the automobile as guests, it
was not until a few minutes before the accident happened
that plaintiffs knew the defendant was tired and sleepy. In
that case the plaintiffs had no opportunity to leave the car
after they knew the driver's condition before the accident
occurred.
1

The court, at page 649, stated:
"The plaintiffs are a young girl about fifteen
years old at the time of the accident and a woman then
about sixty. They were ·riding as guests of the de-
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fendant in the rear seat of his automobile. It is true
that the jury could have reasonably found that each
knew that the defendant was tired and sleepy and
that· he realized he might fall asleep while driving
the car, yet thereafter, without remonstrance or effort to guard themselves from danger, they continued
to ride in it for a few minute~-just how long the
record does not disclose."
·
The court, in that case, in discussing the defense of assumption of risk, (page 649), stated:
"And the doctrine can only apply where the particular situation or condition producing the risk has
continued for such a length of time that the party
alleged to have assumed it can be found to have known
it or been charged with knowledge of it, to have appreciated the risk to which he was subjected by it,
either actually or because he ought reasonably to
have done so, and to have had an opportunity to avoid
it."
The facts in our case fit squarely with all of the conditions stated by that court as being required in order to apply
the defense of assumption of risk.
Cited in Appellant's brief is the case of Erickson vs.
V ogt, 80 Pac. 2d 535. In that case the court, in discussing
the facts, ~t page 536, stated:
- "While it is true that in the instant case the
parties had both been drinking during the time they
were at the dance hall, and had the case been submitted to the jury it might have fo~nd respondent to
have been so far intoxicated as to affect the safety of
his driving, either by making him drowsy or otherwise, still the evidence does not indicate that his ap-
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pearance was such as necessarily to warn appellant
of his inability properly to drive. So far as appears,
she may have had no reasons for real apprehension,
at least until he fell into the doze and grazed the curb,
and may not, even then, be chargeable with fully realizing her danger or being· in any position to have
avoided it."
The facts in our case go far beyond the facts in that
case. In our case the plaintiff testified that the driver of
the van told him that he was tired and sleepy and that he
wanted the plaintiff and his buddy to ride with him to keep
him awake. Under those circumstances the plaintiff could
have refused to ride or he could have left the van at Wendover or. at Delle.
In Appellant's brief is cited the case of Smith vs. Williams, 178 P. (2d) 710. In that case it was held that the
fact that the guest was asleep at the time the driver was
overcome by sleep did not, as a matter of law, bar the guest's
right to recover. It clearly appears from the opinion in that
case that the guest did not know that the driver was sleepy
at the time the guest went to sleep.
In our case there can be no dispute as to the plaintiff's
knowledge of the condition of the driver because the plaintiff
testified that before he got into the van the driver told him
that he was tired and wanted plaintiff to ride with him to
keep him awake.
The acts and conduct of the defendants, which are alleged and relied upon by plaintiff as constituting willful
misconduct are set forth in Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's
amended complaint:
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''That said carelessness, recklessness and willful
misconduct consisted of the following: That the individual defendant, within the hour preceding the accident hereinafter set out, and while driving said
truck, fell asleep, and thereafter and to and including the time of said accident, was sleepy and tired,
and was in an unfit mental and physical condition to
drive and operate said truck on said highway, in this,
that he had driven and operated said truck without
relief or sleep, or without rest, for a distance of more
than 600 miles; that the individual defendant knew
of his said mental and physical condition, and knew
that the continued driving and operation of said
truck while in said condition, would be accompanied
with extreme and probable danger to all persons riding therein, including plaintiff; that notwithstanding
his said condition and said knowledge, the individual
defendant, carelessly, recklessly and with willful misconduct continued to drive and operate said truck,
with plaintiff as a guest passenger aforesaid, and
that upon reaching said point approximately onefourth of a mile east of said Lake Point Service Station, the individual defendant again fell asleep, and,
as a result of his so doing, said truck left said highway, went out of control, -travelled off said highway
for a distance of 600 feet~ and turned over three
times.''
The testimony of plaintiff shows that every act and
circumstance relied upon ~s constituting willf~l misconduct
on the part of the driver was known to plaintiff and acquiesced in by him, and that he accepted the ride and continued
to ride notwithstanding the fact that he had ample opportunity to refuse to ride and to leave the van before the accident happened.
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...

We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
affirmed.
INGEBRETSEN, RAY, RAW,LINS & JONE,S,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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